North Korean Extraction Mission Brainstorming Pt. 2
There typically are a few reliable options when planning a mission like this. However, due to the unique nature of the situation, some of our more basic tactics are moot.
A Run & Gun is completely out of the question. Even if we could take advantage of a rouge para-military unit already operating inside of NK’s borders, prison guards will be more numerous, armed and have at least basic training, maybe more depending on how dangerous/valuable the inmates are considered.
Unfortunately the only scenario that make’s sense is the one we are least prepared for in regards to NK: A mission centered around human intelligence.
We need a handler to turn a mid to high level prison officer. Finding the right person and making contact would be REALLY difficult part. However, we have something very valuable we can offer this person: Help us extract our citizens, and we will also extract you and your family.
See, the higher up in the food chain you progress in NK, the more access to information you have. These officers would have a much higher awareness of the outside world vs. NK citizens, who are practically worthless (informationally) due to isolation. You can’t run counter intel on people who don’t know anything.
So, we bait the officer with the prospect of freedom, this ensures he has just as much to lose as we do if the mission is compromised. We set up a rendezvous point just inside the NK/China border. From there we can escape to SK or Japan by sea, or legally leave China and head to SK or the US depending on the nationalities of the extraction team (I’m convinced a South Korean PMC would be the go to group for this scenario). Unfortunately, China is a far as we can bring the asset and his family. They will have been briefed ahead of time that they are on their own once in China’s borders and if caught they will be considered illegal aliens and deported back to NK. We should do our best to hook them up with a local member of the NK Underground Railroad. But, once outside of NK, our obligations to the asset have been fulfilled.
Now, the good and bad of this scenario is that we rely heavily on our asset, the North Korean officer.
The good is that he has a lot to gain if he is successful and he loses everything if he is compromised. This ensures that he is going to try his damnedest to be at that rendezvous point.
The bad is that there is a single point of failure. If he is compromised, that’s it. We have no plan B besides starting over with another asset. By that time, I expect our targets will have been moved to a more secure local, meaning (at least) serveral more months of basic information gathering before we can try again.
To be continued…